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TheDemand for Funds by State and
Local Governments
SUMMARY
The usual reason that state and local governmental units borrow
in the capital markets is to finance lumpy capital expenditures.
On some occasions since World War II state governments have
borrowed to pay soldiers' bonuses. In a very few instances cities
and local governmental units have borrowed to meet budgetary
deficits. But since the Great Depression such use of their borrow-
ing powers has been rare; the dominant reason sending financial
managers of governmental units to the capital markets is to cover
a planned capital expenditure.
State and local governments usually feel bound by the strong
tradition for an annually balanced current budget and are some-
times so bound by law. On the other hand, borrowing for capital
purposes is widely sanctioned. In many states it is easier for a local
government to get tax power to cover debt service than to make
capital outlays directly.' An added reason for borrowing, however,
is that many governmental units find it almost impossible to save
in advance for capital expenditures; if they try to do so the pressure
for tax reductions becomes irresistible. There are exceptions, of
course; during World War II many state and local government
units accumulated liquid reserves which in effect financed some
early postwar capital expenditures. Nevertheless, the financing of
capital expenditures out of accumulated funds is otherwise quite
rare.
In many ways the circumstances that cause state and local gov-
ernments to borrow are not unlike those which cause private cor-
porations to borrow. There are, however, great differencesthe
1Thepublication Horizons JOTModernPennsylvania Local Government, put
out by theAssociatedInstitutes of Government of Pennsylvania Universities,
November 1957, Vol. iv, No. 10, reports, "In 1957 the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania passed legislation which permitted certain cities
and townships to establish reserves for future capital expenditures. Two years
earlier similar power had been given to boroughs. This authority made it pos-
sible for a local governmental unit to put itself on a pay-as-you-go basis for
capital expenditures."
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kind of financing policies and financing limits that control the
operations of the state and local governments and those which
control corporate operations. Corporate capital expenditures are
clearly limited by some sort of earnings or gross profits test. This
test is not applied with the same rigor to state and local govern-
ment expenditures except in the case of revenue financed projects.
The limits on state and local government borrowing are more
likely to be either constitutional or statutory limits than earnings
limits. As a result, the financing policies of the managers of state
and local government affairs really do not have any close analogy
to those of corporate financial management.
The character of borrowing varies by level of governmental unit.
For example, state governments frequently have such large budgets
and such detailed financial plans that they can plan and schedule
capital, expenditures to correspond roughly to the expected stream
of tax receipts. This is particularly true for expenditures such as
roads which may be tied to receipts from gasoline taxes. At the
other extreme, very small governmental units are likely to find
capital expenditures much more lumpy and therefore more de-
pendent on financing by borrowing. The proportion of capital
expenditures at local levels that is financed by borrowing is con-
siderably larger than the proportion of capital expenditures at
state level that is so financed.2
Since borrowing tends to be for capital expenditures, the time
profile of state and local government borrowing is likely to lead
the timing of their capital expenditures. State and local govern-
ment capital expenditures do not seem to be influenced by minor
cyclicalfluctuations. Such expenditures, however, were clearly
curbed during the Great Depression. While they have not yet
achieved a true counter-cyclical character, state and local govern-
ment capital expenditures do not appear to have been retarded
during the three minor postwar recessions, and may have been
stimulated in 1954.
Though state and local government capital expenditures do not
conform except to very broad cyclical influences, the financing of
them appears to be somewhat more sensitive to short-term cyclical
2R.W. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States (Princeton Uni-
versity Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1955), VoLi,Tables
G-4-61 and 15.
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influences. State and local governments traditionally arrangefi-
nancing fully before making any capital expenditures; in other
words, financing leads outlays. As a result, financing might also
be expected to show little cyclical influence. This does not seem
to be the Among the financing limits that are put on state
and local governments, there is frequently a limit on the rate of
interest that may be paid. These limits, combined with a natural
desire to minimize financing costs, cause state and local govern-
ments to be particularly coy in attempting to time their market
offerings advantageously. It would be inappropriate to contrast the
financing policies of state and local governments with those of
private corporations in this regard, but it is possible that state and
local governments are more sensitive to interest rate fluctuations
than are corporate financial managers. In any event, quite a. bit
of latitude is used by state and local government managers in timing
their offerings to the capital markets. As a result, the pattern of
state and local government financing is quite erratic and highly
variable over the short-run, even though not conforming to any
clearly recognized minor cyclical pattern.
The ultimate limit on the demands for funds by state and local
governments is a combination of the demand of their citizens for
capital expenditures and the ability of these units to service debt.
The first of these factors eludes measurement, but the second is
subject to fairly clear and explicit statistical testing. The ability
of state and local governments to service debt is basically their abil-
ity to collect taxes. This is in turn a limit that is determined not
merely by the value of assessed property but also by the tolerated
level of tax rates.
The structure of this chapter will follow the sequence of topics
introduced in this summary in analyzing the demand for funds.
It will consider first the relationship of capital expenditures to
financing. Then it will examine the financing policies of state and
local government financial managers. Following this, differences
in financial policies and financial practices by level of government
will be analyzed. Next the timing of borrowing, both in terms of
its cyclical content and its short-term variability, will be examined.
Finally, the ability to service debt and the relationship of this
ability to the demand for funds will be reviewed.
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CAPITAL EXPENDITURE IS THE PRIME CAUSE OF MOST
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT BORROWING
A modest portion of state and local government capital expend.
iture is covered out of current receipts—roughly one-third in 1955.
The remainder is financed by borrowing. Such borrowing accounted
for the major share of state and local government borrowing—in
the postwar decade about eight-ninths of it. Evidence on this point
is found in the Federal Reserve purpose classification for new long-
term issues. This tabulation, summarized in Table 1, shows that
TABLE I









Sewer and water 4,494 11.4
Residential building 2,868 7.3
Veterans' aid 2,865 7:2
Miscellaneous public service
enterprises 2,000 5.1
Bridge and tunnel 1,607 4.1
Hospitals and institutions 700 1.8
Port and airport 680 1.7
Recreation 308 .8
Industrial building 106 .3
Other 2,780 7.0
'Unidentified," i.e.,
under $500,000 4,998 12.7
Total new capital 38,090 96.6
Total refunding 1,341 3.4
Grand total 39,430 100.0
Source: Summarized from Federal Reserve Board unpublished mimeograph
tabulation of state and local government security offerings by purpose.
refunding and veterans, bonus issues accounted for only about one-
ninth of the identifiable types of borrowing during the postwar
decade; the remainder was to finance capital outlays. As nearly
as can be estimated, only a modest fraction of these capital outlays
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was for land and existing structure; most was for new construc-
tion. Furthermore, it appears that most construction was on a con-
tract basis: force account construction (that which is done by regu-
lar government employees) apparentlyisrather less frequently
financed by market borrowing. An exception in some states is high-
way construction. Other examples are hard to find. Annual figures
for purpose of borrowing are shown in Table 2 in dollars; the
percentage array of these figures is made in Table 3.
The relationship of state and local government borrowing to the
capital expenditures of these governmental units during the post-
war decade is tested in Table 4. In this table the borrowing for
veterans' aid (bonuses) and for refunding has been omitted; the
remainder can be treated as a reasonably close estimate of borrow-
ing for true capital expenditures.
Anticipatory borrowing apparently has been common during the
postwar period. The low rates prevailing during much of this
decade, particularly on tax-exempt borrowing, had the effect of
stimulating borrowing of funds not immediately needed. State and
local government units could borrow with tax-exempt obligations
and turn about and invest the proceeds in Treasury securities which
were taxable obligations to many other holders. Since state and
local governments are tax-exempt institutions perSe, theyused the
privilege of tax exemption on their own issues to help to solve
their liquidity problems.
Table 4 shows that the proportion of new construction expendi-
tures to borrowing in the same year declined regularly from 1946
through 1951, the ratio dropping from a level of over 70 per cent
to under 50 per cent. This is contrary to what one would expect.
Both the amounts of capital expenditure and of borrowing 'were
increasing rapidly; if the timing of their increases were not par-
allel, then a quite different construction should be put on the fig-
ures. This evidence more properly suggests that borrowing is usu-
ally Undertaken somewhat in advance of the period of construc-
tion. The practice of completing financing before starting construc-
tion is general in revenue-supported projects. Buyers want to be
assured that the project can be finished and prefer advance guar-
antee of' costs to the full extent possible. When short-term interest
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TABLE 4
Borrowing for Capital Expenditure Compared with New
Construction Outlays of State and Local Governments, 1946-1956
New
Construc-
Propor- tion as a
tion of Pro por-
Borrowing Propor- Previous tion
for Capital New Total tion of Year to of Total
Expendi-Construc-Expendi- col. 1 to •Current Expendi-
ture tures col. 2 Yea.r tures
Millionsof dollars Per cent
1946 1,010 1,431 11,133 70.6 12.8
1947 1,639 2,482 14,513 66.0 40.6
: 17.1
1948 2,155 3,638 17,902 59.2 45.0 20.3
1949 2,626 4,917 20,393 53.4 .44.0 24.1
1950 2,944 5,375 22,638 54.8 49.0 23.7
1951 3,147 6,436 23,902 48.9 46.0 26.9
1952 3,996 6,715 25,486 59.5 47.0 26.3
1953 5,336 7,243 27,165 73.8 55.2 26.6
1954 6,626 8,477 30,070 78.2 62.9 28.2
1955 5,742 9,161 32,718 62.7 . 72.3 28.0
1956 5,274. 10,044 35,483 52.7 57.0 28.2
a Includespurchases from business.
Source: 1 1: "new capital" minus "veterans' aid." Cols.
2 and 3: National Income Supplement, 1954, Table 9, pp. 172-73, for 1946-53. Figures for 1954
to 1956 from National Income Division, Department of Commerce; annual estimates in Survey
of Current Business. Cols. 4, 5, and 6: computed.
If the long-term borrowing of each year is compared with the
new construction outlays of the following year, as is done in col-
umn 5 of Table 4, the results follow a quite different pattern than
that in column 4. They show a fairly steady level from 1947
through 1952 and thereafter increase fairly sharply. The presump-
tion that borrowing anticipates new construction expenditures by
about one year is not entirely unreasonable, On some of
projects, such as toll roads and bridges, the period of anticipation
is clearly much longer than one year. On other and smaller types
of construction projects the degree of anticipation may be less than
one year.
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The time pattern of the increases in the borrowing ratio shown
in column 5 is consistent with other well-known facts of state and
local government finance. In the early postwar period the liquid
assets accumulated during the war, combined with the high re-
ceipts of these governmental units due to excellent business con-
ditions, made it possible to cover the cost of more than a half of
new construction out of current revenues. But during the later
years of the decade, expenditures for new construction mounted
faster than total expenditures.
The proportion of new construction financed by borrowing is
not, of course, a converse measure of the degree of state and local
government saving. New borrowing is generally in serial form and
the repayment of debt by state and local government has usually
been in excess of the rate at which state and local government
assets should be Furthermore, allowances for force
account construction are in addition to the contract construction
figures in Table 4. Census estimated such force account construc-
tion to have been $615 millions in
Although state and local government capital expenditures seem
to have burgeoned in the postwar period, they were about the
same proportion of total state and local government expenditures
as in the 1920's. Measured as a fraction of national product, how-
ever, total state and local government expenditures have tended
to become slightly larger.5 If allowance were made for the expendi-
tures financed by federal grants but for essentially state and local
government purposes, the tendency for these expenditures to grow
might be more evident.
SButnot by particularly comfortable margins. Goldsmith's Study of Saving
shows the depreciation on original cost basis for state and local government
depreciable assets combined to have been $1,538 million in 1949. Depreciation
on a replacement cost basis was figured to be $2,836 million, or about 85 per
cent higher. Table 4 suggests that about one-half of state and local government
capital outlay is financed by borrowing. These figures suggest that depreciation
on an original cost basis for assets acquired by borrowing was about 0.8 billions
of dollars, or 1.4 billions on a replacement cost basis. The probable retirement
of long-term debt in 1949 was just about equal to the larger of these two fig-
ures. See Tables ci and 13, pages 1045 and 1063, Vol. i.
4 Summaryof Governmental Finances in 1954, Table 15 (Government Divi-
sion of the Bureau of the Census).
5Someforecast that the proportion may grow further. See 'The Expanding
Role of State and Local Governments in the National Economy," Monthly Re-
view, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June 1957; also see the Severson esti-
mates in State and Local Government at the Crossroads, National Committee
for Municipal Bonds, January 1958.
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BORROWING POLICIES OF STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNITS
Law and tradition control much of the borrowing process; the
margin left for policy determination by finance officers is modest.
But some of these factors are of considerable importance in terms
of market strategy.
The timing of offerings is one of the subjects left, in part, to
administrative policy. Many full faith and general credit offer-
ings, however, leave the finance officer relatively little latitude. If
the public demand for the projects involved is considerable, there
is not much public sympathy with waiting because "the market
is temporarily weak." Public administrators have some latitude;
they can vary the time of announcement and can even reject all
bids if they find them unacceptable. But the margin of maneuver
is not much more than a few months. The officers in charge of
financing public authority projects usually exercise somewhat greater
latitude in selecting offering dates.
The maturity of most public offerings is also administratively
determined. Observation of new offerings announcements suggests
that terminal maturities of 20, 25, and 30 years now dominate
the serial offerings. A few run longer; this is sometimes true of
PHA contract housing authorities bonds. A few issues, usually state
bonds, are limited to maturities of as short as 10 or 15 years. Term
bond issues based on the revenue of specific projects are generally
issued with initial maturity of 30 or 40 years usually qualified by
some kinds of call provisions. Some underwriters report that the
maturity of new offerings has been stretched out in recent years
somewhat beyond those prevailing in the 1920's or 1930's. They
suggest that 15- and 20-year terminal maturities were dominant
then. This view, however, is not universally held.
State and local government security maturities are sometimes
geared to the life of the asset being financed, as is usually done
in business finance, but the practice seems to be less general.° It
is more common to find that maturity has been tied to some esti-
mate of revenues. For example, most water and sewer issues, whether
revenue or based on full faith and credit, appear to be given a
0Forexample, railroad equipment trust obligations are given a modal life
of about 15 years because this is a conservative estimate of the economic life
of equipment. Right.of-way bonds, on the other hand, have very long maturi-
ties.THE DEMAND FOR FUNDS
maturity so that anticipated receipts cover the serial maturities
and interest requirements comfortably. As a result such maturities
are often put at about 30 years. But water and sewer systems are
not fashion-determined projects; no technological obsolescence of
them is in prospect; and they seem to remain operative for many
decades and even for centuries. The other side is illustrated by
school building bonds. Before 1940, issues of such obligations usu-
ally had a terminal maturity of 20 years and many issues still ob-
serve that limit. But there has been a tendency for school bond
maturities to be stretched out to 30 and even 40 years. This ap-
pears to be particularly true of the school building issues of authori-
ties or corporations such as are used in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and
Kentucky because of restrictive debt limits. Here the relation be-
tween the final maturity and length of economic life of the under-
lying asset may be the opposite of that observed for water and
sewer bonds. Public school buildings less than 40 years old and
even less than 30 years old are already being called obsolete. Will
some of the bonds now being sold outlive the school buildings
the construction of which they finance?
The market itself has variable preferences with respect to the
length of the terminal maturities. Sophisticated finance officers are
reported to adjust their offerings to such changes in market toler-
ance, but the practice is far from common. One notable exception
to this rule is the Public Housing Administration; it has become
very sensitive to the state of the market and its tolerance of terminal
maturities.7 Twice it has changed the maturities of its offerings
to meet current market conditions.
The apparent elongation of maturities in recent state and local
government offerings may be explained by factors parallel to the
factors that account for the lengthening of mortgage maturities.
Lenders have developed an increased tolerance to them; borrowers
have discovered the greater freedom it gives them. As a result,
borrowers less often put an equal dollar amount in each maturity
than they did formerly; they lighten maturities in the early years
and concentrate them in later years. In periods such as 1955 and
1956 when commercial banks are reluctant buyers, underwriters
welcome such schedules of maturities.
8th Annual Report, Housing and Home Finance Agency (1954); PHA sec-
tion; p. S65.
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During recent years the maturities of many• issues seem to have
been stretched out a bit from earlier standards on the excuse that
the longer issues were callable. The privilege of calling a serial
issue usually becomes effective only after about a decade, and cus-
tomarily in the reverse order of maturity. In many cases where
taxes have been pledged for the service of a callable bond issue,
it is likely that the securities with the longest maturities will be
retired before the intermediate maturities. The practice of calling
in reverse order of maturity was adopted initially to permit state.
and local governments to get fully out of debt in advance of the
final maturity. This sometimes leads to what is known in the trade
as a "humpbacked" offering scale: yields of the longest bonds may
be below those of the intermediate maturities.
A recent buying practice of underwriters has blocked such calls,
apparently quite inadvertently. In most sales, buyers are permitted
to name the coupon structure. Because of the conventional mu-
nicipal form of interest cost computation, underwriters sometimes
put absurdly low coupons on the final maturity such as 1/10th of
one per cent.8 When this is done, the governmental unit must jump
the hurdle of calling (usually at quite a bit above par) a security
that, on a market yield basis, is worth much less than par. The
advantage of the call privilege to borrowers can be reduced con-
siderably by this
Short-term credit is used in state and local government financial
management but in a rather restrained way at present. Excessive use
of it appears to have led to difficulties in the past and so it is avoided.
Furthermore, if short-term credit exceeds expected tax receipts,
refunding of this debt can be embarrassing. Commercial banks often
are hesitant to refund short-term credit with more short-term credit.
Some investors are reluctant to buy long-term obligations where
they fear the management of short-term debt has been unsound;
Whether this fear has any substance in fact or not, it appears to
be genuinely held. The Public Housing Administration is one of
8Thereasons for this odd practice are explained in Appendix n.
9Thiswas clearly true of two $30 million issues of California school bonds,
one in November 1955 and the other in March 1956; also a City of Louisville
issue marketed in April 1956. In all three cases, the existence of low terminal
coupons ofone per cent on the two California issues and ofone per
cent on the Louisville issue) skimmed off a large part of the potential advantage
of call. It is not clear that state and municipal finance officers are as yet fully
aware of this result.
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the few public bodies to make extensive use of short-term credit.
It has guided the local housing authorities into a program of using
short-term notes for projects under construction.'° This agency fol-
lows closely the fluctuations in interest rates and often uses short-
term credit in an effort to wait for relatively favorable long-term
rates. These PHA short-term notes often account for almost half
of the total of short-term state and local government credit out-
standing. Table 5 tells the story of infrequent resort to short-term
financing in the postwar decade.
TABLE 5
Long-term and Short-term State and Local Government Debt
(Interest Bearing), Year-ends, 1945-1956
Short-term
(Maturity of Ratio of Short
One Year or Less toLong-term



















































LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT BORROWING
State and local governments borrowed heavily during the post-
war period primarily because of a mounting demand for public
capital improvements. Population growth has increased the demand
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for new housing and public services. But while population, particu-
larly at the lower age levels, has been growing, its location has
also been shifting. Rural families have been moving to the city,
and city population has been moving from urban to suburban areas.
Some cities and one Federal Agency have been attempting to coun-
ter the blight of urban centers by improved housing (slum clear-
ance), improved public facilities such as streets and parks, and
better sanitary systems. Almost every one of these developments
compound the need for public capital expenditures: sewer and
water systems, schools, roads, hospitals, public housing authority
projects, parks, and the like.
Then, too, the automobile is a great multiplier of public ex-
penditures: drivers want better roads (and will sometimes pay tolls
for the use of such roads), they also want better parking facilities
whether on-street or off-street. And better roads should not be iden-
tified merely with the dramatic through highways; the demand is
also for better local roads and side streets. The extension of hous-
ing in areas of increasing radii around the hubs of great cities—
made possible by the automobile—means the building of entirely
new sets of streets and roads. Automobile registration doubled in
the postwar period.
This strong and insistent public demand often encounters the
obstacle that our forefathers frequently put rigid limits on the
power to tax and to borrow in state constitutions or into the
statutes creating local governmental units. The demand for public
services that require borrowing often comes in conflict with the
legal limitations on such borrowing. For reasons that a political
scientist but not an economist might try to explain, this conflict
has not been met head-on. Much legal ingenuity has been devoted
to finding ways, other than by a direct constitutional change or
statutory revision of circumventing the effect of law without break-
ing it. This is a complex business at best. It takes an exceptional
amount of legal skill to tread such a narrow and devious path.
Not that such acts should be thought of as involving a moral
breech: indeed the lawyer who finds some way to finance the con-
struction of school buildings so evidently needed by a growing pop-
ulation in spite of a constitutional debt limit that seems at first
glance to make this impracticable, doubtless feels that he is doing
a public service. But the fact remains that the market for state
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and local government securities is complicated by the existence of
a great deal, of borrowing that, while legal, has had to be tailored
into a pattern of legality by considerable indirection.
Investors in state and local government obligations are under-
standably sensitive to the pitfalls of this complicated legal founda-
tion. Investment bankers and public officials are similarly disposed.
As a result, virtually every step of this business is guided or sanc-
tioned by legal advisers. Prudent public officials or bodies do not
initiate or announce their intention to borrow until they have the
advice of counsel. Investment bankers retain counsel and clear all
questionable matters with them. All bids and all sales are condi-
tioned upon the delivery of legal opinions by firms of repute; the
point is of such consequence that it appears in the advertising of
almost every new issue. In fact, investors appear to discriminate
among law firms; an opinion from a well-known firm is to be pre-
ferred to one from a more obscure firm. A copy of this approving
opinion is attached to every bond as it is issued. In the secondary
market, the sale of a bond without a copy of the original opinion
("ex opinion") is awkward and sometimes impossible. Even with
all of these safeguards, it is not always possible to be certain that
legal obstacles will not delay bond sales or the delivery of bonds
after the sales have taken place. Taxpayer suits are given respectful
hearing by the courts.'1 While some investors do not seem to worry
about the legal problems that might complicate their portfolio
operations, many do; the necessary caution involved takes time and
adds to the complexity of this business.
The legal restrictions on the borrowing power of individual state
and local government units are sometimes reflected in the market
by the appearance of novel types of governmental organization.
For example, states sometimes create or establish new authorities
which have the power to borrow, and sometimes to tax, in such a
fashion that the offspring can do what the parent body cannot.
Judging the credit quality of many state and local government
11Forexample, the biggest issue of state and local government obligations
ever sold—the $415 million issue of Illinois Toll Road bonds—came to market
in October 1955 and had been all sold by the formal offering date. But delivery
was delayed for about two months by taxpayer suits, a matter of considerable
inconvenience to the firms handling the deal and not without some influence
on the prices of both state and local government obligations and Treasury
obligations during the period of delay.
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obligations naturally means that one must look beyond these forms
and see the economic and political realities that underlie them—
assuming counsel confirms the fact that these devices can stand
the test of
aharness of legal restrictions explains
partially the widespread requirement that bonds be sold by com-
petitive bidding. Originally competitive bidding was required in
the sale of state and local government obligations to avoid the
connivance of politicians and investment bankers. The protection
of self-interest that might be expected to police direct negotiation
in the marketing of corporate obligations does not prevail in public
finance. The market's valuation of some of the more complexly
devised state and local governments is so uncertain that competitive
bidding may be needed to protect innocent public finance officers.
Without such a guide, the arrangement of a fair price by nego-
tiation might be often disputed and uncertain. As a result, com-
petitive bidding is accepted without much debate even though
many underwriters resist the practice in the field of corporate fi-
nance. It is significant that lately the rule of competitive bidding
has been broken with increasing frequency. The major exceptions
have occurred in the case of the new authorities that borrow on
the basis of the revenue expected from the projects they sponsor.
The laws creating the new authorities operating revenue projects
have not always required competitive bidding; a number of these
bodies have negotiated their financing without public bidding.
Competitive bidding doubtless explains some of the characteris-
tics of the market for this group of securities. The process of get-
ting out an announcement or invitation to bid, and the interval
that must be allowed for bidding groups to organize, takes quite a bit
of time. The public officials or finance officers of state and local gov-
ernment units try to anticipate market conditions but this cannot be
done as adroitly as is possible in negotiated financing; the time of the
sale may come when dealer inventories are high and the bids are bound
12Notalways as clear as might be expected. For example, B. U. Ratchford
has argued quite persuasively that certain types of (and possibly most) revenue
bonds are not tax-exempt. See Bonds and Tax Immunity" in the
National Tax Journal, March 1954, Vol. vii, No. 1. Any decision confirming
Ratchford's view would have a devastating impact on the market for such obli-
gations; in fact a suit challenging the existing immunity would have wide mar-
ket repercussions even if the general view were that it had little chance of
succeeding. The market is sensitive to threats, no matter how remote.
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to be unfavorable. Until shortly before the sale a finance officer can
call off the sale without creating ill will; this is done occasionally. Once
the sale is held, finance officers are reluctant to reject all bids even
if they consider none of them very good. The leaders of organized
bidding groups—managers of syndicates and other investment bank-
ers—condemn such an action as having wasted their time and money
in organizing groups and preparing bids. For these reasons all bids
are seldom rejected. Frequently the price at the time of reoffering
is higher than the best bid rejected. The unwieldy mechanics of
competitive bidding may have the unintended result of building
up inventories when the market is generally recognized as being
weak. This sort of involuntary expansion of dealer inventories may
account in part for the erratic character of this market, dealt with
more fully in Chapter 6.
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT BORROWING
AT VARIOUS LEVELS
States and local governmental units that borrow vary widely both
in size and in character; they are so various that they make for a
complex market. No other open capital market covers such a wide
range of borrowers. Corporations whose securities are traded in
the public markets, particularly the organized exchanges, usually
are the larger ones. The market for corporate bonds is relatively ho-
mogeneous as to size and character of corporate issues. The market for
residential mortgages on single family dwellings is almost uniformly
one of small borrowers; it is keyed to and organized around that situa-
tion. This is not true of state and local government finance. Some
states and a few cities borrow in such large amounts that they can be
compared only with the most massive corporations. At the other ex-
treme, many tiny units of local government often have to borrow.
While such diversity might have been expected to have resulted
in cost penalties for the small, obscure, and unfamiliar type of
governmental organization, some cost-of-financing estimates pre-
sented in Chapter 4 suggest that such penalties attach only to very
small units. Those large enough to offer their bonds on the na-
tional market, though relatively small, show no evidence of suffer-
ing any Sort of size penalty. The principal marketing institutions
have shown considerable skill and adaptability in handling the
securities of smaller units and of conducting educational campaigns
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to create markets for unfamiliar types of obligations such as school
authority bonds. However, one should not overstress the point.
State and local government has paid a price for having a hetero-
geneous and complex organization.
Virtually every kind of state and local governmental unit is a
potential borrower on the new issues securities markets. State gov-
ernments head the list, cities and towns of all sizes and varieties
enter this market; so do school districts and other special purpose
districts, counties, townships, boroughs, parishes, as well as specially
created authorities. The number of potential borrowers is vast; the
Bureau of the Census reported the number of state and local gov-
ernment units to be over 102,000 in 1957.13 Of the total that might
borrow, roughly 15,000 to 20,000 units have exercised this privilege.
Some have borrowed many times. The number of outstanding is-
sues is probably at least 25,000 and it may be
Distribution of this borrowing activity by level of governmental
unit may be measured by the debt outstanding or by the gross
volume of new offerings. Unfortunately, data for the two classifi-
cations come from different agencies and so the results are not
entirely comparable. The classification of debt outstanding is taken
from figures estimated by the Bureau of the while the
classification of the type of new issues put on the market comes
from the Federal Reserve tabulation already cited.16 The outstand-
ing debt of state and local governmental units based on Bureau
of the Census data is shown in the first column of Table 6, and
the gross amount of long-term debt issued in the postwar period
in columnDifferencesin classification, where not reconcilable,
are indicated by the offset arrangement of the table.
Coincidence accounts for the fact that the amount outstanding
in 1954 should have been so near to the gross amount of new
financing during the decade. State governments account for about
13 "Governments in the United States in 1957," Bureau of the Census.
14 On January 1, 1955, 2,810 outstanding issues covering a somewhat smaller
number of issuers had been rated by Moody's Investors Service. In 1950; Moody's
estimated that 20,100 issues were outstanding. The number of issues to which
new ratings are assigned by Moody's each year runs from one-sixth to one-tenth
of the number of long-term offerings listed by the Bond Buyer. Since this source
misses some of the smaller issues, an estimate of 25,000 issues now outstanding
seems more reasonable. Friend, et a!., Over-the.Counter Securities Markets, Table
2-4, p. 54.
15 Survey of Governmental Finances in 1954, Tables i8 and 19.
16 See source note for Table 1.
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TABLE 6
Long-term State and Local Government Debt:









State 9317 25.3 9,637 24.4
County 2,624 7.1 2,549 6.5
Township 782 2.1
City (municipality) 13,892 87.6 8,750 22.2
Schooldistrict 5,827 15.8 4,820 12.2
Special district
(special authority) 4,455 12.1 8,555 21.7
"Unidentified," i.e.,
under $500,000 5,119 13.0
Total 36,898 100.0 39,430 100.0
a Federalreserve classification, where different, in parentheses.
Source: Col. 1: summary of governmental finances, 1954, Bureau of the Census,
Table 18. Col. 2: computed. Col. 5: summary based on Federal Reserve Board
unpublished mimeograph tabulation of "Long-term Security Offerings of State
and Local Governments by Issuing Authority." Col. 4: computed.
a quarter of the total in each case. If the amount that is reported
as "unidentified" in the Federal Reserve classification is roughly
divided between school districts and smaller municipalities (where
most of it probably belongs), it is evident that city borrowing is
the most important single segment. When the market labels all
state and local government obligations "municipals" itis almost
more literal than figurative. School districts are set apart when
they are identifiable as such, but it is known that in many areas
the finance of public schools cannot be separated from city finance.
Special district financing, a rapidly growing part of the total, is the
other principal kind of state and local government unit.
CYCLICAL INFLUENCES ON THE TIMING OF STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT BORROWING
The only available annual series of state and local government
capital expenditures is the one provided by the national income
estimates of the U.S. Department of Commerce. These estimates
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are available back to 1929. This annual series suggests that while
the capital expenditures of state and local government may be
curbed by a massive depression such as the one suffered from 1929
to 1933, they were very little affected by the fairly sharp downturn
between 1957 and 1938 and they were not discernibly affected by
the mild postwar dips in 1949, in 1955-1954 and in 1957. On the
other hand, there is no evidence that state and local government
capital expenditures tend to be countercyclical; a more correct state-
ment would be that they are insensitive to moderate changes in
business activity, though responsive to drastic ones.
Strategic elements in the timing of borrowing. Even though state
and local government capital expenditures appear to be insensi-
tive to moderate cyclical influences, the borrowing to finance them
appears to be sensitive to a number of short-run market influences
of a countercyclical nature. This is made possible by latitude in
the timing of borrowing already mentioned. The latitude financial
managers have in the timing of their market actions may explain
this erratic quality. They try to delay financing when conditions
appear unfavorable but then hurry to the market when conditions
improve. As Chart1shows, seasonally adjusted state and local
government borrowings for the postwar period show an increase
in the 1949 downturn and at the 1953-1954 downturn and again
near the end of 1957. On the other hand, in the periods of peak
private business activity, borrowing seems to have been reduced.
To the extent that state and local government financial managers
use their timing latitude successfully, they have been a true counter-
cyclical influence in the market.
There are limits to their capacity to play this role. While state
and local government financial managers can temporarily withdraw
from active capital markets and avoid high interest rates, sooner
or later they are forced to overcome their reluctance and to enter
the market for needed funds. In other words, there is some evidence
that there is a cyclical character to state and local government
borrowing of a very short period and relatively moderate amplitude
which is related to the state of the capital markets but not related
to somewhat broader business developments.
Interest elasticity of demand for funds. State and local govern-
mental units have faced sharply increased costs of raising funds in
the postwar period. The issue of interest cost has become a political
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CHART 1
State and Local Government Securities
Sold by Public Offering, Monthly at Annual Rates, 1946-1957
Billions of dollars
Unadjusted series
6—month moving average of seasonally adjusted series
Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions and unshaded
areas, expansions, according to National Bureau of Economic Research refer-
ence dates.
Source: Bond Buyer; seasonal adjustment by Shishkin method.
issueof consequence. The Federal Reserve has been charged with
responsibility for impeding the construction of school buildings
and sanitary facilities. In periods of tight money no bids have been
received for some and in other cases all bids have been re-
as being unreasonably high. These circumstances illustrate
the economic question being discussed here: the degree of interest
elasticity in state and local governmental demands for funds. In
practical terms, did the episodes of unsuccessful or abortive financ-
ing result only in short deferment, or has tight money sometimes
produced a true and lasting reduction in the volume of financing?
Evidence in the next few paragraphs suggests that the first cir-
cumstance is nearer reality than the second one. Many of the issues
for which bids were rejected or for which no bids were received
were later reoffered successfully. Even when remarketing has not
been attempted, capital projects have sometimes been financed in
other ways. For example, in quite a few states the funds accruing
17Thisis more often than not accounted for by an unrealistic interest rate
limitation in the invitation to bid.
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in public retirement funds are normally invested in taxable obli-
gations. But under stress these funds have been used to buy tax-
exempt issues that had been unsuccessfully offered on the market.
The burden of higher interest cost is thus either put on the ben-
eficiaries of these retirement systems or deferred for the govern-
mental units concerned if the retirement benefits are guaranteed.
Experience during periods of tight money markets. It may be said
that in the postwar period to date tight money markets have oc-
curred only in 1952-1953 and again in 1955-1957. During both pe-
riods an appreciable number of state and local government issues
that had been planned or announced for offering were either de-
ferred or offered unsuccessfully. Pickering has estimated that in the
second quarter of 1953 the volume of such issues was about $300
million.18 He also found considerable evidence of deferral in late
1952 and the first quarter of 1953. In general, however, most of
the financing deferred appears to have reached the market later.
A similar estimate was prepared by Morris for the 9-month pe-
riod July 1956 to March 1957. He estimated deferred financing in
that period to have been $539 It appeared that a major-
ity of the issues were only deferred but had not been abandoned.
Deferment, of course, performs an economic function.
One point on which these two investigators agree isthat the
enduring effect of higher interest rates is more evident in revenue
obligations than in the case of general obligations. Pickering
pointed out that the coverage of debt service in the case of rev-
enue obligations was often relatively modest so that the changes
4
ininterest costs could have wiped out what would otherwise have
been considered an acceptable margin of coverage by most pru-
dent investors. Experience subsequent to the Pickering memoran-
dum illustrates this point very well. In 1954, 40-year bonds for a
planned toll road with estimated safety margin acceptable to in-
vestors could have been sold at a yield of around 31/4 per cent.
No such issues were brought to the market in late 1956, but the
prices on toll road bonds in the secondary market indicated that
comparable obligations would have had to bear about a 43/4 or
18Thisestimate appears in an unpublished Federal Reserve manuscript, "Ef-
fects of Credit and Monetary Policy Since Mid-1952 on State and Local Govern-
ment Financing and Construction Activity," by Richard C. Pickering, dated
April 18, 1955.
19ByFrank E. Morris in the IBA Statistical Bulletin, April 1957. No. 3, pp. 1-4.
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even a 5 per cent coupon. The resulting increase in debt service
cost would amount to about a fifth. In other words, a project for
which the engineers had estimated a coverage of debt service of
1.5 times—apparently acceptable to many investors—when an in-
terest rate of 31/4 per cent is assumed, would have found itself with
a coverage of only 1.2 times if an interest cost of 43/4percent had
to be expected. Such a coverage is usually thought to be too small
by most investors.
Experience in periods of ease. While there have been several
episodes of easy credit in the postwar periods, the only one studied
with any intensity was Pickering's study of the year 1954.20 His
conclusions, while quite tentative, suggested that the large volume
of issues in the year 1954 was partly due to the moderately lower
rates.2' Many projects were made feasible by the rates then pre-
vailing which would have been marginal at much higher rates.
Unlike deferments during periods of credit tension, the volume
of general obligations that were made feasible by lower interest costs
cannot be estimated by objective tests. As already indicated, this
can be done in a general way for many revenue obligations, though
there are exceptions. For example, the elasticity of demand for
the services of sewers and sanitary systems probably is far less than
for toll roads. The illustration used above is not applicable to all
types of revenue obligations. It is not at all impossible, however,
that as much as one-tenth of the offerings in 1954 were generated
by the favorable terms then available. The amount might be larger.
Similar evidence might be uncovered if the year 1958 were to be
scrutinized.
THE ABILITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNITS
TO SERVICE DEBT
Except for revenue obligations (which will be separately treated
in Chapter 7) the ability of state and local governments to service
their obligations is based on their ability to tax. This rule is quali-
fied by a few exceptions but they are unimportant and can be
neglected.
The ability to tax is better measured in terms of the practical
20 Memorandum cited above in note 18.
21 The same observation could have been made of the first half of 1958.
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limits than of the legal limits on its exercise. Tax revolts are not
unknown in the United States and in a few cases debt defaults
apparently resulted from these revolts. Defaults on state and local
government obligations in the 1930's suggest that local governments,
while sensible of the rights of creditors, are even more sensitive to
the pressure of their own electorates. Public bodies will default in
an extremity before they will put intolerable burdens on their citi-
zens. State and local government taxes at the end of the postwar
decade were about the same proportion of personal income as in
1939. Some margin for increased taxing therefore probably exists.
But residents of some rapidly growing suburban towns appear to
feel that the margin is not too remote. At present levels of taxation,
debt service of all forms of state and local government units ac-
counts for about one-tenth of tax revenues or slightly more. But
such an average may conceal considerable dispersion. The distribu-
tion of debt service among individual governmental units is what
counts. For example: annual debt service appears to be only about
one-twentieth of annual state tax revenues; indeed the whole debt
of states is less than one-year's tax receipts. In the case of local
government, debt service appears to require between one-sixth and
one-seventh of tax receipts. The total debt of these units is almost
three times their annual tax receipts. The most significant fact is
that the ratios of debt service and of debt to taxes appear to be
growing at all levels of state and local government.
The critical point is an intangible one: How willing are state
and local government electorates to tax themselves? Almost every
full-faith and general credit obligation outstanding is supported
by adequate assessed value and adequate income—if debt payment
is put high in the list of preferences .by the citizens of the govern-
ment owing it. State and local taxes are frequently quite regressive.
Most of the citizens who vote for bond issues also pay some of the taxes
that retire them, but they may not be conscious of the commitment
for tax increases that such borrowing implies. A simple illustration
will make the point clear. Toll road traffic studies suggest that the
demand for toll road services, particularly by commercial users, is
quite elastic. If all roads were paid for on a "pay-as-you-use" basis,
it is almost certain that our national demand for highways (and
maybe automobiles) would shrink. People—even though they pay
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the same ultimate cost—seem more willing to vote bond issues for
free road than to pay for toll roads.22
Not only are there differences between states and local govern-
ments, but there are great differences among states and among local
governmental units in their debt burdens and their ability to serv-
ice them. This is shown in the following series of three charts.
Chart 2 ranks the per capita debts of states in 1955. The states which
have high debts by this test are not necessarily those which have
been growing rapidly; indeed, rank correlation of debt and growth
was only .11.28 Chart 3 shows a similar array of the cities. Both
charts demonstrate the vast disparity in individual governmental
units with respect to indebtedness.
When we examine differential borrowing costs in Chapter 6 we
shall find: that, all other credit factors being equal, those states and
cities which borrow sparingly tend to get premium treatment by
the market; those which borrow heavily, even if of good credit
quality, have to pay a penalty for the frequency of their resort to
the market. Some differences in debt among governmental units,
particularly among states, are accounted for by differences in the
level at which various governmental functions are provided.
Differences in income levels might be expected to account for
the diversity in debt levels. If this test could be applied to city
and suburban debts, the results would be of great interest; some
significant results might be found. But the only data available to
us for test were for states. As a preliminary very simple test, the
effect of income differences was tested by comparing debt to per-
sonal income. The results are shown in Chart 4. While some of
the extreme differences are ironed out by this adjustment, more
remain than were suppressed. The conclusion remains inescapable:
differences among states and among local governmental units are
great. Averages are of little use in measuring the ability of state
and local government to service debt. This coul4 be tested only by
a kind of case study, something far outside the aims (and resources)
of this project.
One factor complicating a relative judgment of credit at the state
22 The Highway Act of 1956 is ample demonstration of this assertion. Traffic
engineers could not conceivably find enough highway locations on which the
amounts of expenditure contemplated by this act could be spent for self-sup-
porting toll roads.
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CHART2
State Government Debt per Capita, by States
(Net debt at end of fiscal 1955)
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CHART3
City Government Debt per Capita, in Major Cities
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level and at the local level is grants-in-aid. In modern times (pos-
sibly in all times, if the record of history were open to us) large
central governments often come to the aid of smaller constituent
governmental units. The federal government aids states and local
governments to perform their traditional functions, such as the
state-aid highway construction program. State governments aid their
constituent local units, and so on. For example, the Pennsylvania
system of financing school buildings by special authorities seems to
be quite dependent upon a system of state aid to schools. Many
other examples could be found. Some feel that the volume of down-
stream grants-in-aid is likely to increase.
The combination of great diversity in the concentration of debt
and of a rising level of borrowing during the postwar decade might
lead to the expectation of some deterioration in the quality of new
offerings. Such does not appear to have been the case. As Table 7
shows, the quality of the new offerings rated by Moody's appears
to have been about as high near the end of the decade as at the
beginning.24 This increase in the quality of securities offered is,
however, not evidence of an improvement of state and local gov-
ernment credit. Rather, it means that governmental units with the
highest credit ratings were infrequent borrowers in the early post-
war period but have since entered the markets to an increasing
extent. The fact that the amount of debt outstanding has increased
tends to reduce at least slightly the quality of the total outstanding.
But the growth of debt has been almost matched by the growth
in income and so sustenance of a high rating for state and local
government obligations is reasonable—if income continues to be
high.
24 The new Housing Authority bonds with PHA contracts (virtually amount-
ing to a federal government guarantee) which have been offered since 1951 are
rated Aaa and tend to improve the average quality. But even exclusion of these
issues, an alternative shown in the lower part of the table, would, not change
the conclusion greatly.
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TABLE 7
PercentageDistribution of State and Local Bonds Rated by




Aaa Aa A Baa Caa
1945 4.2 16.2 46.1 27.0 6.4
1946 7.6 22.7 47.6 19.2 2.8
1947 16.4 50.2 20.2 11.6 1.4
1948 33•9a 23.2 31.2 10.5 1.1
1949 9.4 30.Z 38.3 20.1 2.0
1950 12.6 41.2 32.6 12.0 1.5
1951 27.0 31.4 28.6 11.6 1.5
1952 23.5 21.2 42.5 10.6 2.1
1953 24.4 31.9 32.1 11.0 .6
1954 22.4 27.0 38.1 11.0 1.5
1955 22.2 29.6 35.0 12.2 1.0
Without housing authority loans
guaranteed by the PHA
1951 15.0 36.5 33.2: 13.4 1.8
1952 10.1 25.0 50.0 12.5 2.4
1955 13.0 36.7 36.9 12.7 .6
1954 13.3 30.24.6 12.3 1.6
1955 11.2 33.8 39.9 13.9 1.1
a Due to $500 million of bonus bonds: $300 million in
New York (2 issues), $200 million in Ohio both Aaa.
Source: Listings of individual issues in weekly bond
service of Moody's Investors Service. These ratings are
sometimes revised and listed in the annual Moody's In-
vestors Manual of Governments. No allowance was made
for the effect of such revisions. Revenue obligations were
included, where rated; but obligations based on revenue
from projects without operating experience are generally
not rated.
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